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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD D. SUTTON, HARVEY L.
RANDALL, GALE V. BARNEY,
and PAUL ANELLA, a co-partner_ship, doing business under the name
and style of BLUE FLAME COAL
COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

C.ase No. 8587

NICK MARVIDIKIS, FAYE OLSEN, CLARON GODLING, MALlO
PECORELLI, FRANK SACCO, and
all others engaged in the picketing of
the coal mine of the Blue Flame Coal
Co., & UNITED MINE WORKERS
OF AMERICA,
Defendants and Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
AND APPELLANTS
Defendants will reply to the arguments and observations made by plaintiffs under the heading "Statement,"
commencing on page 2 of their Brief, and will then reply
to each point set forth in their Argument in the order in
which said points appear in said Brief. The figures in
parentheses refer to the page number of the Record.
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Since this is an equity ease, and the Supreme Court
may examine the evidence and make its own findings
and render judgment in accordance therewith, defendants do not deem it necessary to comment further on
the trial court';:; evaluation thereof.
Plaintiffs urge that Walter Odendahl shut the mine
down not because of antagonism to unions in general,
or the United Mine Workers of America in particular,
but because of financial inability to meet the terms of
the union contract. The evidence discloses that on numerous occasions Mr. Odendahl had stated that if the mine
was unionized he would close it down (255, 269); the
evidence also shows that before hiring some of the employees involved, they were specifically asked as to their
attitude about unionizing the mine, and were cautioned
that if the mine was unionized, it would be _shut down
(270).

There is reason, therefore, to suspect that

the mine was shut down, not for the reason given, but
antagonism to unions in general on the part of Odendahl.
He had never tried to work under union oontract. Defendants offered to show that other mines in tllis area
comparable to that of Odendahl, "i th sin1ilar haulage and
other problems were operating profitably under union
contract, but were precluded from malcing such a showing over plaintiffs' objection (19~-3--1). The evidence
indicates that financial inability to 1neet a proposed
union contract is a common exruse used against union
organization (189).
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3
Plaintiffs cite Tarr V. Amalgamated Ass'n of St.
Elect. Ry, etc. 250 P. 2d 904, to the effect that it is the
prerogative and constitutional right of any businessman
to continue or discontinue in business as he sees fit.
However, this right like so many others, is not absolute.
It is subject to the qualification that it must be exercised
in such a manner as not to encroach upon the lawful
rights of others.
In the T.arr case, supra, the court laid considerable
stress upon the proposition that plaintiff had started
a new city bus service under a new franchize with his
own equipment, and was not a successor of the defunct
company. Therefore he was not bound by the union contract, and the dispute which existed on March 9, 1951
did not therefore survive as a labor dispute against
plaintiff. It was implied that if the plaintiff had been a
successor of the defunct company, which formerly operated the buses, the situation might be different. The
Court further found there was no labor dispute involved.
This was a 3 to 2 decision, indicating considerable doubt
.about the correctness thereof.
From the dissenting opinion of Justice Porter, we
quote:
"Respondent was a successor to the Pocatello
transit company with full knowledge of the existence of the labor dispute. By his acquisition of
the business enterprise employing the involved
employees, he should not be permitted to extinguish the rights of such employees. Sutter V.
Amalgamated Ass'n, etc. 252 Ala. 364, 41 So. 2d
190.
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"The dispute between the Pocatello Transfer
Company and Appellants was a la:bor dispute
within the me aning of Section 44-712, I.C. Boise
Street Car Company, V. Van Avery, 61 Ida. 502,
103 P. 2d 1107 ... "
1

In the case at bar, Mr. Odendahl retained substantial
financial benefits from the terms and provisions of the
Lease to plaintiffs (Exh. B). He was to receive a commission from the sale of coal mined, and was therefore
certainly interested in it being operated. Odendahl also
has large sums owing him for the equipment and machinery set forth in said lease. He was present with his
counsel during the entire trial of this case below, and
was one of the principal witnesses for plaintiffs. In
view of all these circumstances, it is questionable that
plaintiffs are starting an entirely new enterprise or are
the sole parties concerned with this labor dispute. It
has been held frequently that to move a plant or discontinue operations when there is a labor dispute is
an unfair labor practice. Bro1cniug Kiug Co. V. Local
195, etc., 111 A. 2nd 415.
Regarding the question as to whether "\Yalter Odendahl coerced 3 en1plo~~ees into terminating their employnlent, defendants do not rely entirely upon Pecorelli's testimony as plaintiffs try to 1nake it appear. The
evidence shows Odendahl·s en1ployees were told from
time to time that if the 1nine was unionized he would
shut it down and tlmt there would be no work for them;
that he eould not operate it as a union nline (255, 269).
As aforesaid, when the mnployees were hired, they were
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cautioned that unions were not wanted .at the mine and
that the mine would be shut down if unionized. After
the men voted to join the union, they did not know
whether there was further work for them a;t the mine
in view of said repeated statements made by Mr. Odendahl and his son, Theron Odendahl. Odendahl refused
to oper.ate the mine even though he was requested to do
so by a union official pending negotiations for a contract
(186). In view of all of said repeated warnings of imminent shut down and loss of jobs in the event of unionization, can it be truthfully urged that there was no coercion
on the part of Mr. Odendahl causing the men to terminate
their employment~ It is all of these repeated threats
rather than Pecorelli's testimony alone which should be
considered on the question of coercion.

Pf

As to whether or not the partnership was bona fide
or sham, plaintiffs state on page 3 and 4 of the,ir Brief
that there is no evidence in the Record to controvert
the existence of the partnership or establish that the
lease was not bona fide. Of course, it is difficult to read
a lease ,and discern whether it is bona fide or sham.
We must examine all the f~acts and circumstances leading
up to its execution. The fact that the partners other th~
Lloyd Sutton, put up no capital investment whatsoever

ar.L

and are drawing about the same wage as coal miners

]ir:

are paid in Carbon County, and are doing the same work
as they did before the labor dispute at the mine, and
that Mr. Sutton was evasive when asked whether or
not he was going to hire additional employees at a
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
later date, (128-9), all cast doubt on the good faith
of the entire transaction. See Saito V. Waiters & Waitresses Union 12 N.Y.S. 2d 283.
Plaintiffs assert defendants .apparently have lost
sight of their antagonist. We are informed it is plaintiffs with whom defendants have their quarrel. Plaintiffs say they have no employees; that Odendahls who
formerly operated the mine with employees are no longer
involved. It is plaintiffs who have missed the point In
Diamond Full-Fashioned Hosiery Company V. Leader
(1937 D.C. Pa.) 20 F. Supp. 467, App. Dismd without
op ( C.A. 3d, 99 F. 2nd 1001), the employer (The Vogne
Co.) had laid off his employees and had determined
to go out of business. The employees were advised it
was being sold. Thereafter the employees and members
of the union began to picket the mill. Their purpose was
to inform the public that the employees had been locked
out and thereby deprived of their employment and that
the company's machinery was being sold and moved.
Plaintiff purchased the machinery .and applied for an
injunclion against the defendants, restraining them from
interfering with the moving thereof.
The court said the employees' position was that they
had been locked out by The Y ogue Company and that
the court was satisfied from the evidence that the sole
purpose of the employees in picketing was to get their
jobs hack; that all the elements of a labor dispute were
present. The court also said,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Whether the defendants' position was justified or had any real basis is beside the point
and is not for this court to pass upon."
The court held that there was a dispute between defendands and The Vogue Company and that it was a labor
dispute under the Norris LaGuardia Act. Quoting further from the opinion,

llllili

nL
mw:
i~r2

mrr::

"The further question arises whether a case
must involve or grow out of a labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendants to come within the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
which provides in Section 13 (a) 29 U.S.C. Sec.
113 (a), 29 U.S.G.A. Sec. 113 (a) that 'A case
shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons who are
engaged in the same industry, craft or occupation ... whether such dispute is (1) between one
or more employers or associations of employers,
and one or more employees or associations of employees.' (This language is almost identical with
34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953 (a).
"It will be seen that the act includes any case
where the parties are all engaged in the same
industry and the dispute is between an employer
and employees. It is therefore not restricted to
cases where the dispute is between the plaintiff
(the buyer of the machinery) and the defendants
but includes a case where one employer in an
industry seeks an injunction against the employees of another employer in the same industry
who are engaged in a labor dispute with their own
employer. In this case, the plaintiff is engaged
in the hosiery industry as are the defendants
and their employer, The Vogue Co. The case,
therefore, comes within the express definition of
the Act and the terms thereof .apply to it."
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The Court ruled that under the terms of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, the court had no jurisdiction to issue
a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from
'Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud
or violence.' See Potdevin Mach. Co. V. Cicala (1952)
115 N.Y.S. 2d 108; Dwight's Coffee Shop V. Davis, 206
Misc. 662, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 847.
Therefore, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and also
under Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, and by the authority
of the cases last quoted and cited, since the plaintiffs
and defendants are engaged in the same industry, to-wit:
the coal industry, and the dispute arose between an
employer, to-wit: the Odendahls, and the employees
(some of the defendants), the federal or state antiinjunction act applies. It is not restricted to a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants only. A labor
dispute exists whenever the e1nployer in an industry
seeks an injunction against employees of another employer in the s.an1e industry \dlO are engaged in a labor
dispute with their own e1nployer. This language would
mean that if Odendahl .and his en1ployees, smne of the
defendants herein, are engaged in a labor dispute and
the plaintiffs herein, to-wit: Lloyd Sutton, et al, seek
to enjoin the said defendants, there is a labor dispute
within the me.aning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the Utah Act. It is understandable that the plaintiffs
would like to narrow the issues as being entirely between
the plaintiffs and defendants. However, to do so would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IT:

be to mis.s the point entirely, (to borrow plaintiffs'
phrase). Our labor laws· are not that simple to evade
and circumvent. The Odendahls had a labor dispute with
their employees, who wanted to negotiate a union contract in order to improve their wages and working conditions, receive medical and hospital benefits, etc. In
order to evade this labor dispute, Odendahls shut the
mine down and executed a lease with Sutton and three
of Odendahl's employees (plaintiffs). Now the plaintiffs
have obtained a permanent injunction against the picketing he-rein by the defendants. Clearly, under the Leader
case, supra, a labor dispute existed under the NorrisLaGuardia Act, and 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953. Both s.aid Federal and State Acts apply in this situation and an injunction cannot be granted.
Plaintiffs argue that there is no labor dispute involved in the case at bar and cite the definition contained in Section 34-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. However, we call
the court's attention to a much more complete definition
of a labor dispute contained in Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953,
which reads as follows :
"34-1-34. Cases held to involve labor disputes-"Labor dispute," "persons participating or
interested" defined. - When used in this act, and
for the purposes of this act.
"(.a) A case shall be held to involve or grow
out of a labor dispute when the case involves
persons who are engaged in a single industry,
trade, craft, or occupation; or who are employees
of one employer; or who are members of the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or an affiliated organiza;tion of employers or employees whether such dispute is (1) between one
or more employers or associations of employers
and one or more employees or associations of employees; ( 2) between one or more employers or
associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or association of
employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves
any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor
dispute' (as hereinafter defined) of 'persons
participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter defined).
(Emphasis mine).
"(b) A person or association shall be held to
be a person participating or interested in a labor
dispute if relief is sought against him or it and
if he or it is engaged in the industry, trade, craft,
or occupation in whi0h such dispute occurs, or is
a member, officer, or agent of any association of
employers or employees engaged in such industry,
trade, craft, or occupation.
" (c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of emploYJ.nent, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any other contra versy arising
ou,t of the respective interests of employer and
employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the pro:rimate relation of employer and employee." (Emphasis mine).

In lJfighty Kt1itting lJ!ills V. Sinensky 151 N.Y.S.
2d 158 (1956), the court said,
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"Certainly organizational picketing is warranted if it consists of truthful announcements by
a labor union whose members are engaged in the
same trade or occupation as those employed in
the picketed shop. Such identity of interest gives
rise to a labor dispute. (Citing cases.) "
lli

;/li

:ri

Y.~

The court in the case immediately above cited also
s.aid that apart from the protection of Sec. 876-a of the
Civil Practice Act (of New York) ( which is similar to
Title 34 U.C.A. 1953), peaceful picketing for organizational purposes is protected by both federal and state
constitutions and cite.s cases in support of this proposition. See Lauf V. E. G. Shinner and Co. (1938) 303
U.S. 323, 82 L. Ed. 872, 58 S. Ct. 578. The U.S. District
Court held no labor dispute existed under the federal
or state law. The injunction granted by the District
Court was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the District Court
erred in holding that no dispute existed under the laws
of Wisconsin (which gives a similar definition of a labor
dispute as contained in Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953). The
court also held the District Court erred in granting the
injunction in the .absence of findings which the NorrisLaGuardia Act makes prerequisite to the exercise of
jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers V. Arkansas Oak
Flooring Co. 351 U. S. 62, 100 L. Ed. 941, 76 S. Ct. 1024.
Where the owners of a theatre were operating the
theatre without the aid of employees, having discharged
their sole employee after demand by a labor union that
he be paid according to the union scale, a labor dispute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was held to exist within the meaning of the NorrisLaGuardia Act in Rhode v. Dighton (1939) 27 F. Supp.
149. See also Fur Workers Union V. Fur Workers Union
(1939) 70 App. D.C. 122, 105 F. 2d 1.
Although it appeared no labor dispute existed between the manufacturer of steel products and its employees, it was held in Bent Steel Sections V. Doe (1939)
170 Misc. 736, 10 N.Y.S. 2d 920 that a labor dispute
existed within the meaning of Sec. 876""'a of the N.Y.
Civil Practice Act where the labor union was engaged
in the same "industry, trade, craft, or occupation" as
that of the manuf;acturers employee.s sought by picketing to unionize such manufacturer's shop, although said
employees were alleged not to be desirous of joining
the union. See also Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry
Market v. Heller (1939) 280 N.Y. ±81, 21 N.E. 2d 687.
On p. 6 of Plaintiffs' Brief, it is alleged that the
picketing herein was coercive in that it W.a$ conducted
on a highway traveled by scarcely anyone other than
plaintiffs and the independent truckers hauling coal from
plaintiffs' mine. Vogt, Inc., Respondent, r. International
Brotherhood, etc. 74 N.,Y. 2d 749, is cited to the effect
tha:t picketing under such circmnstances is not the exercise of free speech but coercion. The picketing involved
in the V ogt case was for the purpose of bringing pressure upon the e1nployer to induce it to eoerce its employees to join the union. A 'Yisconsin Statute forbade an
employer to coerce an e1nployee to join the union. Therefore, the object of the picketing was to induce the employSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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er to violate the state law. However, in the case at bar, the
situation is reversed. All employees of Odendahls joined
the union and selected defendant union as their bargaining agent, and notified the employer of their action. The
employer objected and would not bargain collectively. It
was within the employees' rights under the Federal and
State Constitutions to join the defendant labor organization, as well as under Federal and State Laws, particularly Sec. 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act and Sec. 34-1-7 U.C.A.
1953. The employer shut the mine down rather than to
have his employees join the union, and made the announcement that he could not operate as a union mine.
If there was any coercion herein, it was on the employer's part and not the employees. The latter were
willing to bargain collectively with the employer but
the employer was unwilling. There is no analogy between the situation in the Vogtt case and the ca.se at b.ar.
Furthermore, the picketing involved in the present case
was on the only highway or ro·ad leading to the mine.
It was a public highway. It was not upon a rural road

where an exceedingly small number of possible patrons
of the owners' might pass as in Vogt. All patrons of
plaintiffs had to pass this highway in order to get to
the plaintiffs' mine, since it was the only road leading
thereto, as alleged in the complaint .and found by the
trial court. This road leads to the only airport in the
county and to other mines in the vicinity. It was often
traveled by people testing out cars as mentioned in the
Record.
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Plaintiffs on p. 7 argue that the picketing herein
was enmeshed in violence-the blowing up of the bridge
and the spreading of roofing nails on the only road to
plaintiffs' mine. Plaintiffs admit there is no direct proof
as to who was responsible for said conduct. We pointed
out in our first Brief that the court made no finding
as to who was responsible for this conduct and could
not do so, as there was no evidence on this point.
Adamson v. U.M.W.A. (Ut.) 277 P. 2d 972. Injunction
is a harsh and drastic remedy. It can not be based
upon presumption nor suspicion. We may theorize plaintiffs committed these acts as a foundation for injunctive
proceedings. We do not wish to engage in a guessing
game with the plaintiffs as to who committed the wrongful acts. Suffice it to say that mere speculation, conjecture, suspicion, and presumption, are not the proper
bases upon which to predicate such a harsh and drastic
remedy as injunction. There must be competent proof
of continuing and violent acts on the part of the defendants in order to justify any injunction whatsoever. There
is no such proof in this case. Any alleged violent
acts must be committed in the course of the picketing. The
act of a lone defendant Faye Olsen 19 days after the
picketing had entirely tenninated w.as not in the course
of the picketing, is not chargeable to the other defendants
herein, and has no connection with the picketing. We
have dwelt upon these n1atters in our first Brief and
direct the court's attention thereto. (Brief p. 33 et seq.).
There is no showing that the language used by the
pickets threatened any violence whatsoever to .anyone.
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We have argued this matter in our first Brief. We simply
call attention here to the testimony of Mr. Sutton where-in he stated he was never threatened with bodily injury
by the pickets (122) and also that he "wasn't going to
take the chance" (of going through the picket line) (122).
The purpose of the picketing was not to deny the
plaintiffs the right to work on account of their nonmembership in a labor union. The evidence discloses that
neither Odendahls nor the plaintiffs were ever requested
to cease operating their mine during the picketing. In
fact, Mr. Odendahl was specifically requested by Pecorelli to continue his ope~ations pending a union contract.
Plaintiffs were likewise never asked to cease operations.
The purpose of the picketing w;as to protect the jobs of
the 5 employees who did not join with Sutton in the
partnership. They were the ones who were denied the
right to work because they wanted to join the union, for
the purpose of improved wages, working conditions, and
other union benefits. It is the employees who have the
right to work whether or not they belong to a labor
union. These employees signed up to belong to said
union and consequently lost their jobs because of union
activity.
The defendants have replied to the matters alleged
under the title "Statement" in Plaintiffs' Brief. We now
address ourselves to replying to the Argument of Plaintiffs and the points discussed thereunder, in the order
the same appear in Plaintiffs' Brief.
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PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN
INJUNCTION IN 'THIS CASE REGARDLESS OF THE FEDERAL LAW.

Under sub point I it is alleged that a state court
has jurisdiction in labor cases involving interstate commerce notwithstanding the F~eral Labor Relations
Management Act when either of the following situations
prevail: (1) whenever the picketing or labor dispute
involves or results in violation of local matters of public
safety and order such as violence, threats, blocking of
highways or violations of declared public policy, or (2)
whenever the National Labor Relations Board under
its "yard stick" jurisdiction promulgation of 195± refuses
to take jurisdiction.
Replying to Point I, we point out that some courts
have denied injunctive relief under an anti-injunction
statute, such as Title 3-!, Ch. 1, U.C.A. 1953 and others
have held injunctions to be barred under such circumstances except upon compliance with all of the procedural
provisions relative to the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes, thereby recognizing the applicability of antiinjunction acts even in cases which involve violence. 29
A.L.R. 2d p. 381, et seq, Sec. ~S. Lauf r. E. G. Slz inner
and Co. (1938), 303 U.S. ~i~3, 8~ L. Ed. 87:2, 58 S. Ct. 578.
The U. S. Suprmne Court held in the Lauf ease that a
labor dispute existed barring the issuance of an injunction, although it appe1ared that the union by nwlestation,
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annoyance, threats, and intimidation had prevented
patrons from entering the plaintiffs' market. See Grace
Co. V. Williams 96 F. 2nd 478, affirming 20 F. Supp.
263; Dean V. Mayo 8 F. Supp. 73.
29 A.L.R. 2nd p. 381, Sec. 28 states,
"It has been held in other CJases that while
the violence may be restrained an anti-injunction
act will preclude an injunction against all picketing."
Cases cited to support the quoted text are May's Fur
& Ready-To-W ear V. Bauer 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E. 2d
279 modifying 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 819, rehearing denied 282 N.Y. 804, 27 N.E. 2d 210; Baillis V.
Fuchs 283 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E. 2d 812, modifying 258 App.
Div. 919, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 724.
In Baillis V. Fuchs, supra, an injunction was
ordered modified so as to strike out all provisions except those restraining violence and breach of the peace.
The court held that while the power of the courts to
enjoin the violence in a labor dispute existed, even under
the anti-injunction Act, this power could not be used
to authorize a prohibition of all picketing, except upon
a specific finding that peaceful picketing was impossible.
In the case at har, the trial court's permanent injunction restrained and enjoined "all picketing," without finding that peaceful picke~ting was :impossible.
Peaceful, as well as, violent picketing is thereby restrained. Defendants have consistently taken the position that if the picketing involved herein was found to
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be violent the court should have enjomed only the violent .acts and not in sweepmg terms prohibited all picketing. See Lilly-Dache, Inc. V. Rose 28 N.Y.S. 2d 303;
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. V. Everett Dist. Council, etc.
11 Wash. 2d 503, 119 P. 2d 643.
We direct the court's attention to the dissenting
opmion in Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees
Union (N.Y.) 22 N.E. 2d 320, wherein Judge Lehman
argued that while the majority had stated that the effect
of the anti-injunction statute was to prevent courts from
enjoining peaceful picketing, they had failed, by their
affirmance of the decree barring all picketing, to give
effect to the statute, and he contended that in the absence
of a definite finding that the violence had been so great
that peaceful picketing was entirely out of the question,
the decree should have been modified to permit peaceful
picketing. This is consistent with the cases heretofore
cited and, in our. opinion, is the better rule. The other
0ases cited in 29 A.L.R. 2d pages 382 .and 383, wherein
injunctions were granted, appear to us to be distinguishable on the ground that there ·was n1ass picketing involved, or peaceful picketing was ilnpossible, or the acts
of the union may have had an unlawful objective, none
of which ,are present in the case at bar.
Plaintiffs allege the picketing herein was in violation of the declared public policy of the State of Utah
as expressed by its legislature in the Utal1 Right to 'York
Law. We find nothing in said statute which deprives employees of their right to picket for organizational purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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poses or to protect their jobs when the employer shuts
a mine down to keep it from being organized, and refuse·s
to bargain with the employees or their representatives.
The public policy expressed in Section 34-16-2 (Utah
Right To Work Law) reads:
"It is hereby declared to be the public policy
of the state of Utah that the right of persons to
work, whe,ther in private employment or for the
state of Utah ... shall not be denied or abridged
on account of membership or non-membership
in .any labor union ... ; further, that the right to
live includes the right to work. The exercise of the
right to work must be protected and maintained
free from undue restraints and coercion." (My
emphasis.)
Plaintiffs have not shown there was undue restraint
and coercion present in the case at bar, but have apparently taken the attitude that any coercion or restraint
whatsoever is subject to an injunction. As aforesaid, it
was defendant employees who were deprived of their
right to work because of union activities. They were
picketing to get their jobs back and for their right to
belong to the union, to work as union men at the mine
and for mutual aid ·.and protection, etc. Sec. 34-16-6,
U.C.A. 1953 (Utah Right to Work L.aw) exempts "peaceful and orderly solicitation and persuasion by members
of a labor union, labor organization or any other type
of association of others to join a labor union . . . unaccompanied by any intimidation, use of force ... etc."
From the above language, there is nothing denying peaceful picketing for lawful labor objectives. The situation
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in the case at bar is the employer did not want his employees to belong to a labor union and did not want the
mine unionized. In our. opinion, the Record clearly establishes this fact. When Odendahl shut the mine down,
to prevent unionization thereof, under the theory of some
of the courts and authorities we have examined, said .action was similar to a lockout. See Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader, supra.
The public policy of this State regarding labor disputes is set forth in Sec. 34-1-23 U.C.A. 1953 as follows:
"Public Policy declared. In the interpretation and application of this act, the public policy
of this state is declared as follows :
"Negotiations of terms and conditions of
labor. should result from voluntary agreement betwe:en employer and employee. Governmental
authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate and other
forms of capital control. In dealing ·with such
employers the individual unorganized worker is
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of enlployment. Therefore it is necessarY that the indiYidual
workman have full freedmn ~f association, selforganization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his einploJlnent, and that he shall
be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of e1nployers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatiYes or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or their
mutual aid or protection."
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The plaintiffs have taken the position that if there
is a conflict between Title 34 U.C.A. 1953 and the Utah
Right To Work Law, the latter should prevail because it
is the latest pronouncement of the legislative policy of
this State. We find no such conflict between the two
acts. Title 34 contains, among other things, certain rules
to be followed in labor disputes, and the Utah Right To
vV ork Act provides thiat no one shall be compelled to belong or not to belong to a labor union as a condition of
employment, or continuation of employment.
The employees in the case at bar had a right to belong to a union and the Utah Right To Work Law does
not take away this right. They had a right to lawfully
picket an employer who refused to permit them to work
because of union activities.
Violence on a picket line which is isolated or episodic
does not warrant an injunction. See Milk Wagon Drivers
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 522, 85
L. Ed. 836; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468.
Plaintiffs cite United Automobile, etc. Workers v.
Wisconsin E.R.B., 351 U.S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 794 to the effect
that the general rule that a state may not, in the furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct which has been
made an unfair labor practice under the federal statutes,
did not take from the states power to prevent mass
picketing, violence, and overt thre1ats of violence.
It is still axiomatic that each ca;:;e must be decided
upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. This is
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perhaps the reason that some decisions of the various
courts appe1ar to be in conflict with other decisions of the
same courts. In the United Automobile Workers case,
the State Board of Wisconsin found that the appellants'
members had engaged in mass picketing, thereby obstructing ingre_ss to and egress from the Kohler plant;
interferred with the free and uninterrupted use of public
ways; prevented persons desiring to be employed by
Kohler from entering the plant; and coerced employees
who desired to work, and threatened them and their
families with physical injury. The State Board issued
an order directing the union to cease the said unlawful
activities. The Board .also ordered that the number of
pickets be limited.
It will be noted that the order of the State Board
which was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court did not
forbid nor prohibit "all picketing," but only the specific
violent acts of which complaint u·as rnade and which
were found to exist. The U.S. Supreme Court said,
"We hold that \Visconsin may enjoin the violent union conduct here involved." (Not all picketing.)
This case is not authority for the proposition advanced by the plaintiffs that the trial court should have
enjoined all picketing or had the right to do so. The
conduct in the case just cited was certainly extreme violence and w.as found to be such, but the State Board and
United States Supreme Court saw fit to restrain only the
violent acts and threats involved and did not lay down a
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rule that all picketing must cease, such as the trial court
ordered in the case at bar in its permanent injunction
from which this appeal is taken. The authority cited
upholds defendants' contention that the injunction in the
case at bar is too sweeping and too broad in that it enjoins "all picketing," and not merely the violent conduct,
if such there was. See Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks,
etc., 234 P. 2d 678, hear gr by sup ct modg (Cal. Super
ct) 18 CCH Lab Gas 65, 735.
Unde,r situation no. (2), plaintiffs argue that if federal jurisdiction exists, and if the N.L.R.B. refuses to exercise jurisdiction in a labor dispute, state jurisdiction
is proper in a case effecting interstate commerce. Lee
Mark Metal Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 596, 30 Lab. Cas. 69,
968 is cited. In the Lee Mark case, it should be noted
that the stated objective of the pickets was ·to close down
the plant even though it meant causing the employees to
be thrown out of work. The pickets are qunted as saying
"We don't give 1a damn about them ( e,mployees). We are
after you (the employer). We want to close your place."
One employee w.as informed by the pickets that a truck
would be blown up and several employees were warned by
the pickets to stay off the trucks or they would be injured. Police protection had to be invoked by the plaintiff, but apparently to no av:ail. The facts of the Lee
Mark 0ase are in marked contrast with the facts in the
case at bar. In the present case, the pickets were trying
to protect their jobs, not to close down the plant and
throw the employees out of work. No threats were made
of blowing up any facilities. In fact, defendants wanted
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the employer to continue operating, not to close down.
No police protection was found necessary in the ease at
bar, because ~there was no violence or threats requiring
the same. The Record discloses that plaintiff Sutton told
Deputy Sheriff Semken that if any trouble arose he would
notify the Sheriff's Office thereof (290). No such notification to his knowledge was ever received (290). Furthermore, the threats and violence in the Lee Mark case
were continuing rather than isolated .and episodic.
In Mighty Knitting Mills v. Sinensky, supra, the
court said after the argmnent of the motion for a temporary injunction, it became known that the N.L.R.B. declined to take action of defendants charge of unfair
labor practice. The Court said,
"It is not for this court to speculate that the
declination was due to rejection of the claim of
unfair labor practice or to a finding that plaintiff's newly formed business has not yet developed
a sufficient 'jurisdictional yard stick' or an interstate character.. Ullquestionably, the Board~s rejection of the charge does n.ot conclusively negate
its own jurisdiction. (Emphasis n1ine.) Retail
Clerks Local v. Your Food Stores, 10 Cir., 2:?5 F.
2d 659 ... "
From the cited portion of the courts opinion above,
it would appear that merely because the N.L.R.B. declines
to act on .an unfair labor prartire eharge, does not conclusively oust the board of jurisdiction or confer jurisdiction upon the state courts. The l\lighty I~nitting :Mills
case, supra, was decided in 1956.
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In Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,74 S. Ct.
161 and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468,
both cited by the plaintiffs on page 13, we point out that
in neither case was there any mention made of any specific amount of interstate commerce which was necessary
to be involved before the N.L.R.B. had jurisdiction. It
is defendants' position that if an act effects interstate
commerce, this is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction
of the federal Board and the States do not have jurisdiction. In the Garner case, supra, the court simply stated
the trucking operations of the employer formed .a link
to an interstate railroad. No controversy, labor dispute,
or strike was in progress, and at no time had petitioners
objected to their employees joining the union. The union
was picketing to induce the employees of the trucking
company to join them to gain union wages, hours and
working conditions. Even though the courts below found
that respondents' purpose in picketing was to coe:rce petitioners into compelling or influencing their employees
to join the union .and the equity court below held that
respondents' conduct violated the Penn. Labor Relations
Act, Sec. 6 (1) (c), providing that it was an unfair labor
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition
of employment, to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization, yet it was held by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Garner that state remedies were precluded, because the federal board had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. (Note that the Penn. Statute allegedly violated by the union contains almost the s.ame
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wording as the Utah Right To Work Law). The U.S
Supreme Court, as well as the Pennsylvania Court held
that the grievance was not subject to litigation in the
state's tribunals.
The power of the legislature to limit district courts
in the issuing of injunctions as it has done in Sec. 34-1-34
U.C.A. 1953, is constitutional. The legislature has simply
stated that a court must find certain f~acts to exist before
an injunction can be issued. It does not take away any
right to issue .an injunction where the proper requirements are met. We have other rules or statutes which
state conditions or grounds which must exist before an
injunction may ,be granted, to-wit: Rule 65 (A) U.R.C.P.
Are these rules or statutes void, simply because the
constitution mentions the right of the District Courts
to issue writs of injunotion Y
Plaintiffs cite Hanson v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, etc. 79 So. 2d 199 to the effect that
peaceful picketing, for an unlawful purpose, that is, in
contravention of the right to work policy of the State,
can be le~ally enjoined. Also Woodard et al. v. Collier,
et al., 78 S.E. 2d 526.
In the Hanson case, supra, a road contractor brought
suit again the union for injunction where the ro.ad contractor had all jobs filled, and it was impossible for him
to hire local re,sidents, who were me~nbers of the labor
union, as desired by the union, unless the contractor
either violated the Right To Work Bill by discharging
his non-union employees or hired local residents, who
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were members of the union, when the contractor had no
need for .additional employees; the picke,ting by the union
to compel the contractor to hire local residents was held
by the court to be for an unlawful purpose and would
be enjoined. There is no such unlawful purpose in the
case at bar. The defendants did not picket in the present
case in order to cause the discharge of any employees of
the Odendahls or plaintiffs. They picketed to protect their
own jobs and for organizational purposes. There was no
violation of the Utah Right to Work Law involved.
It is interesting to note that in the Hanson case, the
defendant therein complained of the broad extent of the
injunction, as the defendants have done herein. The defendant in Hanson claimed that the injunction should
have been limited to picketing "which has for its purpose
to force the employer to diS'charge non-union men or to
require him to employ only and exclusively union men."
The court, after citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union, etc.
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., supra, and Building Service Employees, etc. v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S. Ct.
784, 788, 94 L. Ed. 1045, and Justice Dougl.as' dissenting
opinion in Local Union, etc. v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 73
S. Ct. 585, concluded,
"We believe that there is merit in defendant's
complaint as to the breadth and scope of the injunction decree in this case and that :it should be
limited to the specific violation of the State law.
Of course, this would still allow picketing for the
purposes enumerated in (.a), (b), (c), (Stipulation
of fact) and even though peaceful, might have
the same effect insofar as economic pressure on
the plaintiff is concerned.
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"It might be argued that the practical effect
of this decision is to void the injunction. May we
again reiterate that it must be remembered that
courts are bound by the law and in such a case as
the one at bar only such picketing as has for its
object an unlawful purpose may be enjoined and
such an injunction under the jurisprudence must
be •tailored to prevent a specific violation of the
State law and cannot be so broad as to prevent
all picketing and particularly that which is done
for a lawful purpose." (Emphasis mine.)
In accordance with the above, the court enjoined only
the picketing which was in specific violation of the state
law. This is what defendants have been contending for in
the case at bar, to-wit: that all picketing should not have
been enjoined herein and if there is found to be picketing
in violation of .any statute or for any particular illegal
purpose, only the illegal picketing should be enjoined.
POINT III
THE PICKETING HEREIN WAS NOT PEACEFUL, AND
WAS FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE.

It is defendants' position that whether or not the
picketing was peaceful or Yiolent has been adequately
argued in defendants' first Brief. \Y e shall not burden
the court with further argmnent on this point. \Ye believe the same is true as to the isolated .act of defendant
Faye Olsen, which is again Inentioned under Point III
of plaintiffs' brief.
Plaintiffs' argun1ent that the picketing was illegal
conduct under the Utah Right To \Vork Law can not be
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sustained. The picketing herein w.as for organizational
purposes, to protect the jobs of the defendants, and was
an exercise of the rights of the defendants under Sec. 7
of the Taft-Hartley Act, and Title 34 U.C.A. 1953. No
one was denying or abridging plaintiffs right to work
on account of membership or non-membership in any
labor union, etc. There were no undue restraints .and
coercion. The right to work, is subject always to economic pressures on the part of unions for better wages
and working conditions. See Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.
2d 746, 155 p 2d 343.
0

In Building Service Employees Int. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, cited by plaintiffs for
the proposition that a state is permitted to enjoin pe.aceful picketing which is in violation of the states public
policy, the picketing was carried on for the purpose of
compelling an employer to sign a contract with a labor
union which coerced his employees choice of a bargaining representative. This is exactly the reverse of the
situation presented in the case at bar, where the employees had voluntarily and freely selected the United Mine
W orker.s of America as its bargaining agent and had so
notified the employer, who refused to barg.ain with or to
recognize the collective bargaining agent so chosen by
his employees. Defendants did not coerce the employees'
choice of a bargaining agent as was the case in Gazzam.
The U.S. Supreme Court said th.at picketing of an employer to compel him to coerce his employees' choice of
a bargaining representative is an attempt to induce
transgression of the states policy, and it was not for that
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tribunal to judge the wisdom of such state policy. Quoting further from Gazz.am:
"The Washington Statute has not been construed by the Washington courts in this case to
prohibit picketing of workers by other workers.
The construction of the statute which we are reviewing only prohibits coercion of workers by employers. We can not agree with petitioners' reading of this injunction that 'whatever types of
picketing were to· be carried out by the union
would be in violation of the decree.' Respondent
does not contend that picketing per se has been
enjoined but only that picketing which has as its
purpose violation of the policy of the State. There
is no contention that picketing directed at employees for organization purposes would be violative of that policy. The decree does not have
that effect." (Emphasis mine.)
And further:
" ... We therefore find no unwarranted restraint of picketing here. The injunction granted
was tailored to prevent a specific violation of an
important state law. The decree was limited to
the wrong being perpetrated, namely, 'an abusive
exercise of the right to picket.' Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. at page 295,
64 S. Ct. at page 127,88 L. Ed. 58. . . ."
Note that in the Gazzam case, the injunction was to
forbid the act of an employer to coerce his employees
into joining the union. It did not prohibit "all picketing"
such as was done by the trial court in the case at bar.
The U.S. Supreme Court calls attention to the fact that
the pieketing "was tailored to meet the specific" situation
in Gazzam. That is all defendants are asking in this
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case in the event it should be found that any injunction
was warranted, ~ather than prohibition of all picketing.
The Marcus Heath case cited by plaintiffs appears to be
the wrong citation. We have not as yet been able to locate this case.
The last case cited by pl~aintiffs under Point III is
Local Union No. 10 et al., v. Graham, et al., supra. The
facts in Graham are at great variance with the facts herein. The complaint in Graham alleged that respondents
had begun work under their contract with the City to
build a school; that early completion thereof was urgent;
that respondents had made contracts with all necessary
subcontractors; that some of the subcontractors employed only union labor while others employed non-union
as well as union labor; that in July certain of the defendants had requested that all non-union labor on the
project be laid off and had said that, unless that was
done 'every effort would be made to prevent any union
labor employed ... on that project from continuing work
thereon'; that certain defendants had picketed the project
and as a result thereof union members on the job had
refused to continue work there and that therefore the
project had "slowed to a standstill." It was alleged that
the objectives of the defendants in making such demands
and conducting such picketing were to prevent non-union
employees from working on the project. The Court found
that the picketing was for aims, purposes and objectives
in conflict with the provisions of the Right To Work
Laws of the State of Virginia and therefore illegal, and a
permanent injunction was issued. In the case at bar the
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mine was voluntarily shut down by the employer, then
leased to the plaintiffs, even though both were told that
the defendants would prefer to have the mine continue
to operate pending negotiations for a union contract.
None of the defendants was trying to have any non-union
members discharged from employment or to cause the
mine to be shut down. While the conduct in the Graham
case violated Virginia's Right To Work Act, the organizational picketing of the defendants in the case at bar
was legal and not in conflict with the Right to Work
Law of Utah.
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Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion points
out there were no specific findings by the Virginia Court
and stated he believed the case should be remanded to
make specific findings. Justice Douglas further said,
"If Virginia is to enjoin this form of free
speech, I would require her to show precisely the
reasons for it. Unless we are meticulous in that
regard, great rights will be lost by the absence
of findings, by the generality of findings, or by
the vagueness of decrees. There is more than suspicion that that has happened here. For the decree permanently enjoins defendants 'from carrying on their picketing or other activities in front
of or around' the construction site. This decree
was not 'tailored to prel'ent a specific violation'
of state law. Building Service Union v. G.azzam,
supra, 339 U.S. at page 541, 70 S. Ct. at page 789,
94 L. Ed. 1045. It is a broadside against all picketing, the kind of general assault condemned by
Thornhill v. State of Alabama, supra. It illustrates the evil consequences that flow from a
fail1tre to be utterly painstaking in isolating the
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precise evils in picketing which the state may
regulate." (My emphasis.)
Justice Douglas lends additional strength to the validity
of defendants' argument in the case at bar that the decree herein prohibiting "all picketing" was entirely too
broad and sweeping, and should be reversed.
POINT IV
NOT ALL PE.kCEFUL PICKETING IS THE LEGITIMATE EXEitCISE OF FREE SPEECH, AND PEACEFUL
PICKETING TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS, WHO OPERATE
WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP, TO JOIN UNION WAS ILLEGAL, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, AND COULD BE ENJOINED.

Plaintiffs, as did defendants, cite International
Union of Operating Engineers etc. v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 Utah 183, 203 P. 2d 404. In our first
Brief, defendants commented on this case. We see nothing in it which is contrary to our position herein. We
believe the Utah case contains a good statement of the
law and recognizes the right of free speech, with its
proper limitations as well as the right of picketing as
free speech, also with reasonable limitations.
Let us analyze Hanke et al. v. International Brotherhood, etc., 207 P. 2d 206 cited by plaintiffs on page 26
of their brief. The facts are set forth briefly by plaintiffs. The real basis of the decision appears to be stated
on page 213 of 207 P. 2d. After reviewing the facts in
Bakery and Pastry Driver and Helpers, etc. v. Wahl,
the Washington court states,
"The facts of the case at bar present no such
appealing picture in favor of the appellants. Local
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882, on whose behalf appellant Local 309 set up
the picket line in front of the respondents' place
of business, represents the used car salesmen
in the Seattle area. Of 115 such concerns, only
10 employ any help at all, the remainder being
operated exclusively by their proprietors. From
this fact the conclusion seems irresistable that the
unions interest in the welfare of a mere handful
of members (of whose working conditions no
complaint at all was made) is far outweighed by
the interests of individual proprietors and the
people of the community as a whole, to the end
that little businessmen and property owners shall
be free from dictation as to business policy by an
outside group having but a relatively small and
indirect interest in such policy."
Thus what the Washington Court did in the Hanke
case was to try to balance respondents' right to do business, free from unreasonable interference, with appellants' rights to freedom of speech, recognizing that
neither of said rights is absolute, in the sense that it may
be exercised in utter disregard of the other. Because
only 10 out of 115 .automobile concerns in the area affected employed outside help, the court decided that
the interests of the overwhelming majority of the dealers
was of greater importance than to protect the handful
of men who were employed.
The situation is exactly the reverse in Carbon
County where the case at bar arose. The Record discloses that the overwhelming majority of the miners in
Carbon County are affiliated with unions. By comparison to the total, the non-union men employed in the
mines are a mere handful. Therefore, adopting the reaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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soning of the Hanke case, the interests of the overwhelming majority of the union men in the mines who are interested in maintaining decent wages and working conditions, medical and hospital benefits, should far outweigh
the mere handful of said individuals not belonging to a
union, who work for lower wages, longer hours and
without medical and hospital benefits, all of which tend
to lower the living standard of the workers.
Furthermore, the Hanke case does not present a situation such as this court has before it, where employees
who were gainfully employed sought to organize a union
and then were faced with a shutdown and then a lease of
the mine, whereupon they picketed for organizational
purposes and to exercise their rights under feder.al and
state statutes.
The authorities cited by plaintiffs commencing with
Morris v. Local Union No. 494 on page 29 of plaintiffs'
Brief and including page 31 thereof, have been cited in
the forepart of plaintiffs' brief and, in our opinion, the
same have been fully analyzed and distinguished.
In order to clarify defendants' position relative to
the picketing herein, it is our contention (1) that the
picketing herein grew out of a labor dispute under the
definitions contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
also Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, in that the same arose after
all of the employees of the Odendahls freely and voluntarily agreed to join the union, selected the defendant
United Mine Workers of America as their bargaining
agent, and so notified their employer. Under both FedSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
eral and State anti-injunction Acts, since the dispute involved was a labor dispute, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to issue an injunction .at all; (2) that the
picketing took place after the Odendahls shut the mine
down, which action amounted to a lockout; that after
the picketing started Odendahls, in order to circumvent
and evade the labor dispute, leased the mine to plaintiff
Sutton and three of their former employees; that all
plaintiffs had full knowledge and notice of the labor
dispute and by taking over the mine when said dispute
was still unresolved and by continuing the same hostile,
anti-union policy as their predecessors, assumed and
adopted the said labor dispute; (3) that the picketing
was to protect the jobs of said employees and to organize the mine and derive the benefits of higher wages, improved working conditions, etc., and not for the purpose
of coercing the plaintiffs themselves into joining the
union or to deny them the right to work; that there was
no violence on the picket line and that if it can be said
that any of the conduct or words used by the pickets were
in the nature of threats, that the srune were isolated and
episodic and not continuous and therefore did not justify
an injunction against all picketing; that the picketing
was not enmeshed in violence to the extent required by
the authorities to w.arrant restraining all picketing; that
it cannot be said that peaceful picketing under the circumstances could not haYe continued; that under the authorities referred to in our first brief and herein, unless
the violent condnet is so en1neshed in the picketing that
peaeeful pieketing is in1possible and unless the court
finds that such is the case, the injunction should enjoin
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only the unlawful and violent act.s, if such there were,
and not "all picketing."
We emphasize that injunction is a drastic and harsh
remedy. In this case it involves the important constitutional right of free speech under both Federal and State
Constitutions; that before a trial court is justified in
permanently enjoining "all picketing," which of neces.sity
includes peaceful picketing, it should find that peaceful
picketing is impossible under the circumstances. We
submit that under the Record the trial court in this case
could not find and did not find that peaceful picketing
was impossible. Therefore, it committed error in enjoining "all picketing."
CONCLUSION
We urge thi.s court to find the facts against the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants and to reverse the
judgment of the trial court. If this court, after its usual
careful and thorough consideration of the facts and the
law herein is not disposed to completely reverse the trial
court, then, in such event, defendants pray that this
court modify the trial court's injunction by deciding that
only the illegal conduct, if any has been shown, should
have been enjoined, rather than "all picketing," which
necessarily includes peaceful picketing. Peaceful picketing should not have been enjoined.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD SHEYA
Counsel for Appellants
Bonomo Building
Price, Utah
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